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BEST CASS SCENARIO* 
Jonathan B. Wiener** 
An invitation to add one’s tribute to a festschrift often elicits a reminiscence1—
perhaps as a kind of full disclosure.  I was a student in Professor Sunstein’s class in 
Administrative Law at Harvard in 1986.  It was a large class, in Austin North, driven 
briskly onward by the instructor’s keen and relentless questioning.  I sat near the back 
and often felt anonymous.  One afternoon I paid a nervous visit to the high-powered 
professor in his office, only to find him youthful, kind, and encouraging.  How much 
such small moments may inflect a life.  After law school and clerkships, I was honored 
to find my way somewhere along his—to become a fellow traveler on at least one of the 
many paths he has trod.  While I was serving in the government and trying to help shape 
policies that avoid unintentionally yielding counterproductive results,2 he was writing 
about these paradoxes.3  When I came to academia, my first book, on risk-risk tradeoffs, 
was lucky to be graced by his foreword4 and to be followed by his own article on the 
topic.5  His work on the cognitive case for sensible cost-benefit analysis6 helped shape 
my later thoughts on European application of this approach.7  Our critiques of the 
precautionary principle have been parallel and intertwined.8  And we have exchanged 
 
 * Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harv. U. Press 2007). 
 ** Perkins Professor of Law and Professor of Environmental Policy & Public Policy Studies, Duke 
University; President, Society for Risk Analysis, 2008; University Fellow, Resources for the Future. 
 1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable 
Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1895, 1895 n. 1 (2007) (reminiscing 
about Sunstein’s early conversation with Richard Posner, in Sunstein’s contribution to an issue of tributes to 
Judge Posner).  One hopes the honoree of a festschrift enjoys the attention.  See Henry Rosovsky, The 
University: An Owner’s Manual 218 n. 3 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1991). 
 2. Including, as a senior staffer at the Council of Economic Advisers, helping to draft President Clinton’s 
Executive Order 12866 on regulatory review.  See Exec. Or. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 3. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407 (1990). 
 4. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, in Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 
vii (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., Harv. U. Press 1995). 
 5. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533 (1996) (reprinted in Cass R. 
Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment 133 (Cambridge U. Press 2002)). 
 6. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1059 (2000) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis].  His interest in cost-benefit analysis dates from his very first 
article.  Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1267 (1981). 
 7. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, in Current Legal Problems 2006 vol. 59, 447 
(Jane Holder & Colm O’Cinneide eds., Oxford U. Press 2007). 
 8. Among the steps on this trail are chronologically: Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and 
the Environment (Cambridge U. Press, 2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Risk and Reason]; Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Precaution in a Multirisk World, in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: Theory and Practice 1509 
(Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003 (2003); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution after All? A Comment on 
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views on climate change, especially regarding how best to engage China and America in 
an effective regime to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.9 
But Cass Sunstein has traveled so many roads—not only risk regulation and 
environmental law, but also constitutional and administrative law, political theory, tort 
law, punitive damages, savings and investment, behavioral psychology and economics, 
and much more.  Somehow, he takes all these roads at the same time, transcending 
Frost’s fork.  No mortal can keep up.  He has been superhumanly prolific.  He has called 
his favorite legal locale Smallville,10 which, of course, is the boyhood home of Clark 
Kent;  and knowing that Sunstein has a super Power, it would not be a surprise to  see 
him take flight—up, up, and away—SuperCass. 
To be sure, he has seen farther in part by standing on the shoulders of giants.11  His 
antecedents are plain among the pragmatists, from Holmes and James and Pound to 
Posner and Breyer.  He channels two great Franklins—Roosevelt12 and Benjamin.13  He 
has gone beyond his forbears, perhaps the furthest among his own ventures, in his effort 
 
the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 207 (Summer 2003); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge U. Press 2005) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Laws of Fear]; Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution against Terrorism, 9 J. Risk 
Research 393 (2006) (reprinted in Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from Risk Management and Risk 
Assessment 110 (Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer, & David Gordon eds., Cambridge U. Press 2008); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Precautions & Nature, 137 Daedalus 49, 50 n. 2 (Spring 2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Precautions & 
Nature]; Cass R. Sunstein, Throwing Precaution to the Wind: Why the “Safe” Choice Can Be Dangerous, Bos. 
Globe 1C (July 13, 2008).. 
 9. A sampling of this conversation includes chronologically: Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global 
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677 (1999) (advocating side 
payments to engage China in a climate regime, through allocation of tradable emissions allowances); Jonathan 
B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global 
Environmental Law, 27 Ecol. L.Q. 1295 (2001); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Designing Global Climate Regulation, 
in Climate Change Policy: A Survey 151 (Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz & John O. Niles eds., Is. 
Press 2002); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto (AEI 
Press 2003); Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Pay China to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Fin. Times (London, 
Eng.) 11 (Aug. 6, 2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 1 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 
107 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2007); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L.J. 1565 
(2008); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives 
of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675 (2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change 
Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1805 (2008) [hereinafter Wiener, China]. 
 10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2867, 2868 (2007) (imagining 
“Smallville” as the ideal place for judicial minimalism). 
 11. See Stephen Hawking, On the Shoulders of Giants: The Great Works of Physics and Astronomy 
(Running Press 2002).  For an “infotopian” (per Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce 
Knowledge (Oxford U. Press 2006)) account of the phrase, see Wikipedia, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stand_on_the_ shoulders_of_giants (accessed Nov. 25, 2008). 
 12. Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More 
Than Ever (Basic Bks. 2004). 
 13. In 2007, Sunstein was awarded the Henry M. Phillips Prize for his lifetime of contributions to the 
science and philosophy of jurisprudence by the American Philosophical Society—which was founded in 1743 
by Benjamin Franklin.  See U. Chi. L. Sch., Cass R. Sunstein Awarded the American Philosophical Society’s 
Henry M. Phillips Prize, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/sunstein-phillips-prize/index.html (May 17, 2007).  
Moreover, Sunstein’s cognitive approach to cost-benefit analysis, as evidenced in Sunstein, Cognition and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra n. 6, harkens back to Benjamin Franklin’s “prudential algebra” for making 
considered decisions that weigh the pros and cons and avoid “rash steps.”  Wiener, supra n. 7, at 483–89 
(discussing and quoting Benjamin Franklin, Ltr. from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772), 
in Frank Luther Mott & Chester E. Jorgenson, Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections, with 
Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes 348–49 (Am. Bk. Co. 1936)). 
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to bring the science of behavioral psychology into debates over law and economics.14  
He is not uncontroversial; like any great scholar, he aims to provoke new thinking and 
has his share of debates.15  He does not fit easy classifications: He is a social liberal who 
wants government decisions to be informed by cost-benefit analysis, cares about 
regulatory costs, and wants experts to help correct the public’s errors.16  He admires 
juxtapositions that foster deliberative moderation, such as “liberal republican[ism]”17 
and “libertarian paternalism.”18 
In this essay, focusing on the field of risk regulation, I highlight future challenges 
that Sunstein’s work ought to address.  The best understanding of his work on risk 
regulation points in three further directions: (1) tackling anew the facts/values 
dichotomy, (2) reconciling the twin commitments to minimalism and to comprehensive 
deliberation, and (3) addressing the future—envisioning future consequences of current 
choices and envisioning our own future preferences regarding how we will evaluate 
those consequences. 
Much of legal reasoning has always run from past to present, from received 
precedents to current rules.  Some view past rules and preferences as natural, and fear the 
risks of new policies.  Others view past behaviors and technologies as natural, and fear 
the risks of new technologies.  But a legal system based on precedent is also necessarily 
forward-looking, because each present decision will bind or influence future decisions. 
Sunstein has been one of the leaders of a school of thought that looks purposively 
to the future: how to design the regulation of emerging risks, how we try to foresee the 
future, and where we collectively want society to go.19  Through an eclectic set of tools, 
 
 14. See e.g. Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., Cambridge U. Press 2000); Sunstein, 
Laws of Fear, supra n. 8; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness (Yale U. Press 2008) [hereinafter Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge]; Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); 
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999). 
 15. E.g. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1071 (2006) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge 
U. Press 2005)); Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1123 (2006) (replying to 
Kahan et al.); Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Life: Economics for Liberals, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 
191 (2004) (critiquing Sunstein’s defense of cognitive approach to cost-benefit analysis); Neil Vidmar, 
Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive 
Damages, 53 Emory L.J. 1359 (2004) (disputing the empirical evidence adduced in Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (U. Chi. Press 2003)); Wiener, China, supra n. 9 (differing with 
Sunstein on the prospects for engaging China in a global climate change regime).  Many other comments, 
critiques, and praises have emerged since Sunstein was named in January 2009 to head OMB/OIRA in the 
Obama administration. 
 16. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection (ABA 2002).  As a 
cost-benefit liberal, he is not alone.  See Alan S. Blinder, Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics 
for a Just Society (Addison-Wesley Publg. Co. 1987); Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward 
Effective Risk Regulation (Harv. U. Press 1993); Wiener, supra n. 7, at 464–65, 471, 474–76. 
 17. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1539 (1988). 
 18. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1159, 1159 (2003); Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra n. 14; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 175, 175 (May 2003). 
 19. He has often looked back to the New Deal.  See Sunstein, supra n. 12; Cass R. Sunstein, After the 
Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harv. U. Press 1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, After the 
Rights Revolution].  But this appraisal has been less to applaud the actual New Deal per se than to explore a 
mode of governance that is not bound to the baseline of past entitlements and that looks to improving future 
outcomes.  Meanwhile, he rejects simplistic slogans of progressivism such as the precautionary principle as 
well as postmodernism.  See Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra n. 8; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 
WIENER FINAL FOR PRINT 6/11/2009  3:27 PM 
936 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:933 
including law, economics, psychology, and neuroscience, he has evaluated expert and 
public choices and has sought ways to correct systematic mistakes.  He seeks reasoning 
as a decision method, and seeks reasons for decision failures.  His core contributions to 
the study of regulation (largely administrative law, but also related fields, including the 
regulatory functions of tort, property, and contract law, the constitutional and political 
theory of government, and the substance of regulatory design) have been to exhort 
institutions and individuals to think through decisions and their future consequences, and 
to bring to bear multidisciplinary perspectives on how we actually think.  He pushes us 
to go beyond—beyond settled rules, static preferences, homo economicus, easy answers, 
simple prescriptions—to see homo sapiens20 as we really are and to see forward-looking 
law as it could be. 
I. FACTS AND VALUES 
A central claim of Sunstein’s work is that people make factual mistakes—heuristic 
errors about availability, probability, optimism, and related factors—which ought to be 
corrected by expertise.21  But while correcting the public on the facts, he would still 
defer to the public on its values.22  He says: “[I]t is undemocratic for officials to neglect 
people’s values, [but] it is hardly undemocratic for them to ignore people’s errors of fact. 
. . . [I]n a democratic society, officials should respond to people’s values, rather than to 
their blunders.”23 
Yet Sunstein also favors “debiasing” people’s normative prejudices.24  And he 
worries about the situation in which correcting factual errors still leaves in place enough 
normative bias to sustain the public’s initial view: 
If most citizens wrongly believe that a 55 mph limit will fail to decrease accidents, officials 
should not base their decision on that error.  If the effect of the change [from 65 to 55 mph] 
would be to save a large number of lives, officials should take that fact into account. 
 To be sure, it is no simple matter to say how officials should respond if most citizens 
reject a 55 mph limit even after having been convinced that many lives would be saved as a 
result.  An obvious question is why, exactly, citizens remain committed to the 65 mph 
status quo.  Perhaps some normative judgment, not a product of factual error and not 
adequately captured in any kind of quantitative analysis, helps to account for their 
commitment.  My only claim is that officials should not, in democracy’s name, base their 
decisions on factual mistakes that are products of bounded rationality.  What can be said 
for the speed limit example can be said for countless other problems involved in risk 
 
1991 Duke L.J. 607, 617–19 n. 47 (critiquing postmodernism for abandoning reasoning). 
 20. Sunstein has juxtaposed the supposedly rational homo economicus to the boundedly rational homo 
sapiens.  See Sunstein, supra n. 15, at 1123; Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 Va. 
L. Rev. 205, 207, 207 n. 4 (2001) (citing Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. 
Econ. Persp. 133 (Winter 2000)). 
 21. Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harv. U. Press 2007); Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra n. 8. 
 22. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 62 
(1995) (“[W]hen the differences [in risk evaluation] arise from clashes between the value frameworks of 
experts and laypeople[,] . . . there is no reason to defer to experts; democracies should be responsive to the 
informed values of their citizens.” (footnote omitted)). 
 23. Sunstein, supra n. 15, at 1111, 1125. 
 24. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. Leg. Stud. 199 (2006). 
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regulation, including those raised by global warming, terrorism, genetic modification of 
food, hurricanes, earthquakes, water pollution, and pesticides.25 
The remaining normative bias about risks, even after education on the facts, might 
reflect the type of invidious views that Sunstein would seek to “debias” in other areas of 
law.  To take an example from environmental law: What if the public’s continuing 
opposition to the reintroduction of wolves (despite expert evidence—correcting the 
public’s erroneous view of the facts—that the risk to humans and livestock is  small) 
derives from a normative view that wolves are intrinsically evil (“dread”), unfamiliar 
(“others”), and unwelcome in human society?  What if this same kind of bias or 
(literally) prejudice against the unfamiliar, the unnatural, the dread,26 the other, is what 
underlies public intolerance of other risks—of new technologies such as genetically 
modified foods, or nuclear power plants, or wind turbines (despite expert evidence that 
they will not cause significant environmental harm), or immigrants (despite expert 
evidence that immigrants will not take away jobs), or foreign-manufactured products 
(despite expert evidence that domestic products are just as risky)?27  And meanwhile, the 
public may prejudicially tolerate familiar, “natural” risks, such as radon, tobacco, 
automobile accidents, weather, domestic products, and others.28 
Such situations blur the facts/values distinction.  They seem to call for a kind of 
debiasing strategy that is both fact-based and value-tinged.29  They call for public 
education (both factual and normative), and for leadership.  The debate over these 
strategies is an old one.  Thomas Jefferson favored the preference-reflecting approach: “I 
know of no safe repository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; 
and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by 
education.”30  Edmund Burke favored the preference-shaping approach: “Your 
Representative owes you, not only his industry, but his judgement; and he betrays, 
instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”31  Perhaps both Jefferson and 
Burke might agree that the best instrumental method of “informing the public’s 
discretion” is via enlightened leadership that both educates and diverges from current 
 
 25. Sunstein, supra n. 15, at 1124–25 (footnote omitted). 
 26. See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2000). 
 27. See Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices behind Environmental Values, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 
151 (1997). 
 28. See Slovic, supra n. 26; Sunstein, Precautions & Nature, supra n. 8, at 54 (citing James P. Collman, 
Naturally Dangerous: Surprising Facts about Food, Health, and the Environment (U. Sci. Bks. 2001)); 
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk in the Republic, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 1, 11–13 (1997); Jonathan 
Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 Ecol. L.Q. 325 (1995). 
 29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 3 (1991) (advocating policies to 
correct the public’s choices when those choices are distorted by market failures such as limited mobility). 
 30. Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson vol. 7, 
177 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854).  See also Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval  (July 12, 1816), 
in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson vol. 15, 32, 33 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904) 
(“‘[G]overnments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of their people, and execute it.’”). 
But see Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (Alfred A. Knopf 1998) (arguing 
that Jefferson was not as pure a populist as is often assumed). 
 31. Edmund Burke, Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll (Bristol, U.K., Nov. 3, 1774), in The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke vol. 3, 64, 69 (W.M. Elofson & John A. Woods eds., Clarendon Press 1996). 
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public opinion to prompt reflection that shapes a new and better public opinion.32 
Sunstein, while warning against going too far,33 has argued that American law 
should be not just preference-reflecting, but sometimes preference-shaping as well.  He 
has observed that existing preferences are not preordained but are often themselves a 
product of past law.34  Most recently, he has argued that all choices are shaped by some 
choice architecture, so that preference-shaping is inevitable.35  He has emphasized 
Madison’s view that representative government would  
“refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body 
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations.”36 
And: 
For James Madison, national representatives were supposed to deliberate on constituent 
preferences, not to implement what constituents “want.”  Moreover, the notion that 
governments can do only what individual actors might prefer is inconsistent with the 
preferences of private actors themselves . . . .  
 In some settings, government decisions that attempt to shape preferences will produce 
significant increases in welfare.  Consider statutes forbidding gambling, or the 
consumption of addictive substances, or requiring the use of motorcycle helmets and 
seatbelts.  In all of these settings, there should be welfare gains from government action, 
quite apart from the impact of the conduct in question on third parties.37 
Moreover, he has linked this preference-shaping role of government to correcting 
intolerant fears—the kinds of prejudicial attitudes that might also arise regarding 
unfamiliar risks: 
 
 32. See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 10–16 (Yale U. Press 1990) (successful 
representatives do not just reflect current public views but respond to and help shape citizens’ “potential 
preferences”). 
 33. Sunstein, supra n. 17, at 1543 (arguing that it is desirable to “avoid the risks of tyranny that are 
associated with active and self-conscious preference-shaping by public officials. The most objectionable 
exercises of governmental power are often associated with approaches that see character formation as an end of 
politics.”). 
 34. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 132 (2002).  “If the endowment 
effect is at work, there is no avoiding a legal effect on workers’ preferences.  Whatever the content of the legal 
rule, preferences will be affected (if there is an endowment effect).  A preference-shaping effect, from the 
default rule, is inevitable.”  Id.  “It should be recalled here that, as a historical matter, enthusiasm for markets 
was itself a product, not of neutrality about preferences, but instead of a desire to produce preferences of a 
certain sort, while encouraging independence, entrepreneurship, and indifference to certain ascriptive 
characteristics.”  Id. at 132 n. 91 (citing Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political 
Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph 69–113 (Princeton U. Press 1977)). 
 35. See Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra n. 14. 
 36. Cass. R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 41 (1985) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, 
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States 54, 60 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
Mershon Co. Press 1898)). 
 37. Cass R. Sunstein, Two Faces of Liberalism, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 245, 246, 251 (1986) (footnote 
omitted); id. at 251 (a “species of liberal thought—reflected in much of modern law—sees the collective 
selection of preferences as a natural and desirable feature of government.  This species of liberalism is, of 
course, subject to abuse.  Those abuses can be controlled, however, thus promoting both welfare and autonomy 
. . . .”). 
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[T]he Constitution does not always allow gratification of private preferences to serve as a 
basis for government action; in fact, preference shaping is an important constitutional 
principle.  The equal protection clause is a good illustration.  In a recent case involving the 
mentally retarded, for example, the Supreme Court said that the Constitution prohibited 
legislators from acting on the basis of their constituents’ fear of and revulsion toward the 
mentally retarded.38 
This kind of fear and revulsion is arguably similar to the fear of unfamiliar, dread 
risks in general.  Evolutionary psychology suggests that early humans survived by 
trusting clan members and distrusting the “other,” the outsider; early evolutionary 
selection pressure may have favored quick recognition of faces as clan member (friend) 
or outsider (foe).39  If so, this kind of reaction may be part of the basis of the 
unfamiliarity/dread heuristic in risk perception.  Modern neuroscience indicates that 
before considered deliberation can occur in the frontal cortex, the amygdala processes an 
immediate discrimination between threats or not, such as snake or stick.40  This basic 
discrimination may be related to base discrimination—to invidious fear and revulsion 
against the unfamiliar other.41 
Thus, selective concern about risks—familiarity, naturalness, availability, and 
related heuristic errors—may derive from the same kinds of normative biases that give 
rise to selective (unequal) treatment of insiders and outsiders.  Without claiming that 
risks deserve “equal protection,” one can see how public evaluation of risk may be 
affected by both factual errors and normative biases, and how some of these normative 
biases may be closely related to the kinds of unequal treatment or discrimination for 
which Sunstein has counseled preference-shaping law.  Sunstein has observed that 
preference distortions can be analogous to market failures, such that our “preferences 
about preferences,” or second-order preferences, would lead us to favor government 
intervention to shape private choices.42 
Perhaps these kinds of inherited prejudices, developed long ago as survival tactics, 
are now vestigial traits that disserve modern society but that continue to be manifest in 
normative biases about types of risks, even after facts are clarified and understood.  If so, 
shouldn’t the preference-shaping function of law be deployed to nudge these value 
frames?   
More deeply, if choice architecture is inescapable (as Thaler and Sunstein argue) 
 
 38. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 (1986) 
(discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
 39. See Virginia Slaughter, Valerie E. Stone & Catherine Reed, Perception of Faces and Bodies, 13 Current 
Directions in  Psychol. Sci. 219 (2004); Elizabeth Svoboda, Faces, Faces Everywhere, 156 N.Y. Times F1, F6 
(Feb. 13, 2007). 
 40. Joseph LeDoux, The Amygdala, 17 Current Biology R868 (2007). 
 41. Relatedly, humans appear to respond more strongly to an identifiable individual than to a larger number 
of unidentified people.  See Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 
14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 235 (1997).  This normative bias appears to lead people to favor saving an identifiable 
individual over even preventing mass calamities.  See Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: 
Psychic Numbing and Genocide, 2 Judm. & Dec. Making 79 (Apr. 2007). 
 42. Sunstein, supra n. 38, at 1169, 1173.  Similarly, Sunstein has more recently commented: “The most 
serious problems with [economic analysis of law] are normative, above all in the suggestion that all preferences 
deserve support, regardless of their origins or of the reasons brought forward on their behalf.  Some reasons for 
action are properly blocked, even if they are based on private willingness to pay.”  Cass R. Sunstein, On 
Philosophy and Economics, 19 QLR 333, 347 (2000). 
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and if choice architecture shapes value choices, then the facts of choice architecture (and 
the selection among such architectures) inevitably shapes expressed preferences.43  If so, 
Sunstein’s dichotomy between correcting facts and deferring to public values would need 
to be bridged, and values would need to be nudged. 
This question remains a challenge to Sunstein’s effort to urge attention to 
behavioral psychology as a critique of cognitive appraisal of facts, while being at times 
deferential to public values and at other times favorable toward nudging public values.  
This clash among competing approaches—fact-correcting and value-respecting, 
preference-reflecting and preference-shaping—could pose a Cass-Cass tradeoff, or even 
a Worst Cass Scenario, which ideally Sunstein can help resolve.  Public officials making 
policy must exercise judgment, not just follow the facts, so they must inescapably choose 
among values.  The presidential candidacy of Barack Obama is a case in point: 
Remarkably, he combined calm and deliberative reasoning about the vital issues facing 
the country44 with an inspirational rhetoric calling the American people to join together, 
to embrace change, to become our better selves, to create our future history. 
II. MINIMALISM VS. COMPREHENSIVE DELIBERATION 
Sunstein wants a law for the future, like the New Deal move away from precedent-
bound common law, that is able to deal with new threats and opportunities rather than 
relying only on the accretion of past tradition.  He favors a kind of comprehensive 
deliberation that considers the full consequences of decisions, that does not fall prey to 
status quo bias or to simple answers like the precautionary principle.45  The tools of this 
deliberation include cost-benefit analysis, risk tradeoff analysis, cost-effectiveness 
analysis and market-based incentive instruments, and a healthy (though not stifling) dose 
of executive oversight.46 
But he recognizes that a forward-moving project may be vulnerable to discord and, 
therefore, proposes that institutions should move cautiously.  In order to secure 
agreement across diverse viewpoints, he favors a kind of incrementalism that he labels 
minimalism, and a kind of partial consensus that he labels incompletely theorized 
agreements.47 
The challenge here is that these two approaches—comprehensive deliberation, and 
minimalism—are in some tension.  Incrementalism or minimalism can counsel 
incomplete analysis of policy impacts, “muddling through” with a limited assessment of 
 
 43. Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra n. 14. 
 44. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Obama I Know: Terrific Listener Goes Wherever Reason Takes Him, Chi. 
Trib. 27 (Mar. 14, 2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, Want a President Who Weighs the Risks Well, News & Observer 
A11 (Oct. 30, 2008). 
 45. See Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra n. 8; Sunstein, Precautions & Nature, supra n. 8, at 57 (“A better 
approach would be to acknowledge that a wide variety of adverse effects may come from inaction, regulation, 
and everything between.  Such an approach would attempt to consider all of those adverse effects, not simply a 
subset.”).  This argument is, of course, not unique to Sunstein.  And there had been critiques of the 
precautionary principle before Sunstein; what Sunstein added is, most notably, the behavioral psychology 
approach to understanding law and economics. 
 46. See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra n. 8. 
 47. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harv. U. Press 
1999); Sunstein, supra n. 10; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733 
(1995). 
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each step.48  But each incremental or minimal step may be a partial solution to a larger 
problem, thereby inducing shifts and side effects that create new problems.49  The 
ambition of forward-looking law that considers full consequences requires a more 
synoptic, comprehensive deliberation (subject to the costs of such deliberation) than 
minimalism appears to offer. 
This may be a question of institutions.  Sunstein may argue that comprehensive 
analysis is better undertaken by the administrative state while the courts are better at 
minimalism.50  But judicial review—taking a hard look, or at least considering the full 
array of consequences—may at times be needed to ensure that administrative agencies 
attend to the consequences of the agencies’ decisions.  On the other hand, Sunstein 
points out that designing regulatory policy well is important across many issues, whereas 
review by the courts is inherently episodic and narrow.51 
Meanwhile, perhaps Sunstein’s minimalism can be combined with a 
comprehensive analysis of impacts.52  Some critics of synoptic analysis fear its result is 
indeed to impede bold action—to induce paralysis by analysis.53  But synoptic analysis 
also enables broad policy changes that regulate comprehensively with fewer adverse side 
effects, thus avoiding backlash and gridlock.  The question is whether minimalism in 
degree of legal change can be married to maximalism (or optimalism) in the scope of 
consequences assessed.  This seems more plausible if one considers that Sunstein’s 
version of consequentialism is not fully monetized economic optimization, but rather the 
cognitive case for cost-benefit balancing: ensuring that the decision-maker considers the 
full set of important impacts.54  This approach is actually supported by cost-benefit 
principles, whenever striving for monetized precision would distract the decision-maker 
from other more important (but more difficult to quantify) impacts.  That is, a 
proportionate analysis sensitive to decision costs would tend toward the “cognitive” case 
for cost-benefit analysis, or what I have called “Warm Analysis.”55 
And Sunstein’s commitment to cost-benefit analysis is not intended or designed to 
impede regulation.  Unlike the notion that cost-benefit analysis is anti-regulatory,56 
Sunstein’s approach is evenhanded, using impact assessment both to restrain bad 
 
 48. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Administration Rev. 79, 81 
(1959). 
 49. See Sunstein, supra n. 4; Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 
Risk 39 (1998). 
 50. Sunstein, supra n. 10, at 2882 (“[I]t remains possible to argue that first-order perfectionism makes sense 
for political participants and their representatives, even if judges should be more firmly constrained.”). 
 51. See Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution, supra n. 19, at 608–09. 
 52. This may be where Sunstein is heading with Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 
(2009).  
 53. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk 
Analysis, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562, 625 (1992). 
 54. See Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra n. 6, at 1060.  This approach may better invite 
an incompletely theorized agreement to use cost-benefit analysis among people of divergent viewpoints.  See 
Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone? 53 Admin. L. Rev. 299, 300 (2001). 
 55. Wiener, supra n. 7, at 483–89. 
 56. See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can 
Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 9–10 (Oxford U. Press 2008) (critiquing Sunstein and others 
for having positioned cost-benefit analysis as anti-regulatory in the past, though ultimately arguing that cost-
benefit analysis can also be pro-regulatory). 
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regulation and to prompt good regulation; to consider benefits, costs, ancillary harms, 
and ancillary benefits.57  (Sunstein could help us evaluate whether White House cost-
benefit review should cover not only decisions to regulate, and to deregulate, but also not 
to act;58 and whether it should apply to “independent” agencies and to a wider arena of 
policy types including counterterrorism,59 banking and finance, trade measures, 
international agreements, and others.)  This is Ben Franklin’s cost-benefit analysis,60 and 
it recalls the early ambition of NEPA to protect the environment through cost-benefit 
analysis.61  Similarly, our work on risk-risk tradeoffs and cost-benefit analysis has been 
criticized as anti-regulatory,62 when our entire point was to point the way toward 
analysis of the “full set of consequences”63 and thus to “regulations that will be effective 
in achieving their own goals.”64  Analyzing how medical care may sometimes injure 
patients is not anti-medicine; it is pro-health.  Likewise, analyzing risk-risk tradeoffs 
induced by regulation is not anti-regulation; it is pro-effective protection.65 
III. THE FUTURE 
The most important challenge for Sunstein’s work on risk regulation is to develop 
a richer account of the future.  While Sunstein writes extensively on policy analysis, 
risks, precaution, and cognitive heuristics, he has so far not said much about how experts 
and the public should actually envision future consequences and future preferences.  His 
chapter on “The Future” in Worst-Case Scenarios, for example, is devoted to the issue of 
whether to discount future impacts, but not to how those forecasts and scenarios of future 
impacts are developed and tested.  How do we envision what will happen?  This is not 
just the province of risk assessment, but also of policy analysis and judgment: analyzing 
 
 57. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? 
Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489, 1489 (2002); Sunstein, supra n. 54, at 313–
14. 
 58. Revesz & Livermore, supra n. 56, at 174 (proposing that advocacy groups could appeal agency denials 
of petitions for rulemaking to OMB/OIRA for cost-benefit review of such decisions not to act). 
 59. See Stern & Wiener, supra n. 8, at 439 (advocating joint OIRA-NSC impact assessments of proposed 
counterterrorism measures, both domestic and international). 
 60. See supra n. 13. 
 61. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1117–18 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Skelly Wright, J., finding that the EIS provision in NEPA section 102(2)(C) requires cost-
benefit analysis of federal projects in order to take into account their previously neglected environmental 
costs).  The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held that NEPA requires only a “purely procedural” exercise of 
informed decision-making—a so-called “stop and think” exercise—with no substantive criteria for such 
decisions.  See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980). 
 62. See Revesz & Livermore, supra n. 56. 
 63. John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in Risk versus Risk supra n. 4, 
at 2. 
 64. Sunstein, supra n. 4, at viii. 
 65. Wiener, supra n. 49, at 42–43(“Concern about countervailing risks has no political brand.  Both 
conservatives, liberals and centrists worry about the dysfunctions of the regulatory state.  Each may emphasize 
different examples—conservatives may worry about the side effects of health and environmental rules, while 
liberals may worry about the side effects of dams, police practices and harsh criminal penalties—but their 
concerns have the same analytic basis.  Countervailing risks are a generic challenge.  The first modern 
environmental law, NEPA, was a response to the countervailing risks of government interventions to achieve 
non-environmental policy goals such as transportation and electrification.  Worrying about countervailing risks 
is not anti-environmental, or anti-law-and-order, or anti-regulatory, it is pro-results; it is the sober habit of the 
pragmatic optimist.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the future consequences of alternative policies and choosing among those policies.  This 
requires foreseeing, envisioning—what the future will bring, and what our future 
preferences will be. 
This area seems ripe for a Cassian66 look at cognition and prediction—what 
Harvard’s Daniel Gilbert and Daniel Shachter call “prospection” or “the prospective 
brain.”67  Gilbert argues that only humans think about the future,68 and yet that 
prospection is hampered by our brains’ limited capacity to imagine futures that have not 
yet happened.69  Schachter, Addis, and Buckner find that we use the same parts of the 
human brain (what they call “neural machinery”) to envision the future that we also use 
to process memories.70  The implication is that human prospection is tied to the past, and 
thus to the biases of the availability heuristic.71  Moreover, Gilbert argues that humans 
err in predicting their own future preferences—our own future selves.72 
And there is a venerable literature on the development of scenarios, from de 
Jouvenel73 to Kahn and Wiener74 to Schwartz75 and others, which emphasizes the value 
of careful attention to detail, context, and the intersection of multiple trends. 
The challenge here is to move from the cognitive or behavioral psychology of risk 
perceptions—explaining why people perceive risks as they do—to the cognitive 
psychology and planning tools of policy comparison—explaining why people envision 
the future as they do, and how to do better.  Schachter et al. write: 
As we and others have argued, since planning for the future is a task of paramount adaptive 
importance, it makes sense to conceive of the brain as a fundamentally prospective organ 
that is designed to use information from the past and present to generate predictions about 
the future.  Such a perspective encourages us to view memory as a key component of the 
prospective brain that helps to generate simulations of possible future events that contribute 
to the formation of plans and predictions.  Such a perspective calls for a shift not only in 
conceptual emphasis, but also a change in methodology.  Rather than focusing 
predominantly on assessing memory with tasks that query the past, greater emphasis 
should be placed on the development of tasks that capture how memory is used to simulate, 
 
 66. In the tradition of “Coasean.” 
 67. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 Sci. 1351, 1352 
(2007) [hereinafter Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection]; Daniel L. Schacter, Donna Rose Addis & Randy L. 
Buckner, Episodic Simulation of Future Events: Concepts, Data, and Applications, 1124 Annals N.Y. Acad. 
Sci. 39, 39 (2008).  So far, Sunstein has written of scenarios, but not of prospection, though he does cite the 
earlier paper by Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of 
Future Affective States, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178, 179 (Joseph P. 
Forgas ed., Cambridge U. Press 2000) [hereinafter Gilbert & Wilson, Miswanting] (using the term 
“miswanting” to apply to a lack of coordination between what a person wants and likes). 
 68. Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness 4 (Alfred A. Knopf 2006). 
 69.  Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra. n. 67, at 1352. 
 70. Schacter, Addis & Buckner, supra n. 67, at 39. 
 71. Id. at 55; see Carey K. Morewedge, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, The Least Likely of Times: 
How Remembering the Past Biases Forecasts of the Future, 16 Psychol. Sci. 626, 626 (2005). 
 72. Gilbert, supra n. 68, at 209–10. 
 73. Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (Nikita Lary trans., Basic Bks. 1964). 
 74. Herman Kahn & Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-
Three Years (Macmillan 1967). 
 75. Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your Company  
(Doubleday 1996). 
WIENER FINAL FOR PRINT 6/11/2009  3:27 PM 
944 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:933 
plan, and predict the future.76 
This shift in focus is consistent with others’ advice to compare policy options and 
their impacts, not compare risks per se, because comparing risks does not help us decide 
which policies to adopt.77  One risk might be large but intractable; another might be 
smaller but easily reduced.  And policies might reduce risks but pose countervailing risk 
side effects.  It is policies that matter. 
Focusing on the future also adds a challenge for consideration of preferences: We 
need to look not only at current preferences, but at our future preferences regarding the 
future consequences of current policy choices. 
Further, it puts emphasis on the dynamic character of policy-making.  Risk 
regulation is not a one-off affair.  The essence of risks is that they occur in an uncertain 
future.  Our errors not only in risk perception but in policy prospection mean that we will 
always be readjusting to changing circumstances.  Risk regulation is inescapably an 
iterative process of learning, adaptive management, and updating.  Precautionary 
policies, if adopted, must be provisional, with continued research and opportunities for 
revision.  Ex ante impact assessment of risk regulation requires validation—ex post 
evaluations to appraise policy outcomes and to test and improve ex ante assessment 
methods. 
From one perspective, all we have is the present: The past is gone, and the future is 
inchoate.  From another perspective, the present is but an instant, lost already; the past is 
not recorded but reconstructed by our memories; and all we can really grasp and shape is 
the endless stream of the future. 
IV. BEST CASS SCENARIO 
It is easy to imagine worst case scenarios in which all our best ideas, including 
even Cass Sunstein’s, are no match for the vicissitudes of the future.  But provided we 
consider all important impacts and avoid “rash steps,” the power of good ideas to meet 
challenges and parry risks has a decent track record in human history.  As Barbara 
Tuchman argued cogently in her classic The March of Folly, governments fail when they 
forsake thinking and reason in favor of impulse and ideology.78 
Good government needs to think through problems seriously (and yet not 
obsessively).  National leadership needs to take seriously the recursive character of the 
challenge: evaluate (prospectively), decide, experience, revise, and then evaluate and 
decide again.  If regulatory agencies give the nudges, if they design the choice 
architecture, then national administration should be alert for errors or biases or interest 
group distortions in those architectures.  In Sunstein’s terminology, leadership should be 
a second-order perfectionist, a choice architect to guide the choice architects—nudging 
the front-line nudgers (the agencies) to do a better job at policy design, prospection, 
evaluation, and revision.  In such a world, we would ask not quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes (who will watch the watchers), but who will nudge the nudgers?  Perhaps 
 
 76. Schacter, Addis & Buckner, supra n. 67, at 56 (citations omitted). 
 77. See John D. Graham & James K. Hammitt, Refining the CRA Framework, in Comparing Environmental 
Risks: Tools for Setting Government Priorities 93 (J. Clarence Davies ed., RFF Press 1996). 
 78. Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam 4 (Alfred A. Knopf 1984). 
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Sunstein, at OMB/OIRA, as in academia, will show the way.  That would be a Best Cass 
Scenario. 
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